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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20060711-CA 
MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1992), and Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures 26(2)(a), whereby a 
defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. The plain and specific language of UCA Section 76-8-305 requires a detention 
under the condition of arrest or arrest to be lawful or authorized by law and within 
constitutional boundaries. When an officer effects an arrest for an alleged offense 
1 
committed outside of his presence, the Court evaluates the legality of the arrest 
objectively, See State v. Ayala, 762 R2d 1107, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), State v. 
Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 (Utah App.), and in evaluating the reasonableness of the seizure 
the Court affords little discretion to the district court because there must be statewide 
standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials, State v. Hechtle, 89 
P.3d 185 (Utah App. 2004). 
II. The State must prove the elements of the crime charged in the information, and the 
instructions to the jury must contain the material constituents of the elements needed to 
find necessary for conviction, based on the relevant legal criteria provided by the trial 
judge. The Court reviews the trial courts instructions to the jury for correctness, affording 
no deference, See Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). The complete 
absence of an element instruction of a crime charged is an error the Court reviews to 
avoid manifest injustice, See Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures 19(c) and State v. Jones, 
823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and constitutional provision are 
contained in the text of this brief or in the Addendum: 
2 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-8-305 Utah Code Ann. Section 78-21-3 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-6 Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-15 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-9-701(1) Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-2 
Utah Constitution Article I Section 14 
United States Constitution Amendment IV 
United States Constitution Amendment XIIII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state charged the appellant with public intoxication, criminal mischief, 
disturbance of the peace, and interference with the arresting officer. Due to 
impecuniosity the appellant was assigned a Public Defender. At the time of pretrial the 
appellant had been transferred between five public defenders. On March 14, 2006 the 
charges were tried in a jury trial and the appellant was found not guilty of all charges 
with the exception of interference in the detention or arrest. 
FACTS 
This case arises out of the detention and arrest of the appellant based on the 
allegations of her next door neighbor that the appellant was disturbing the peace and was 
damaging her property. The district court entered no findings of facts. 
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BACKROUND 
The following general facts were established at trial: The appellant had been 
renting a duplex apartment that included a carport space and had been planning on 
moving sometime in the future. Her next door neighbor made plans to move in to 
appellant's larger unit, and prematurely purchased some furniture which the appellant 
agreed to let her neighbor store temporarily in back of her carport until she could make 
other arrangements. Instead, and without authority, her neighbor subsequently abrogated 
the appellant's entire carport space in the appellant's absence. The night of her arrest the 
appellant returned late to her residence to discover her carport barricaded with her patio 
furniture and stacked full of the complainants property, a note on her door from her 
neighbor that her "stuff had to come in to the appellants unit, and her dog, a small 
beagle, missing from her premises. After a lengthy search of the area the appellant could 
hear her dog whimpering from under the objects haphazardly stacked up under her 
carport space. 
When she called her small dog repeatedly, her dog did not come out. She therefore 
started removing the barricade and pushing some of the objects aside. As she did, two of 
her plastic patio chairs tumbled over and her neighbor came outside and threatened the 
appellant that she was calling the cops to have her arrested. The appellant summoned the 
landlord living nearby, for assistance, and then entered her car to move her car behind her 
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carport for light. The appellant admitted at trial that due to the rain and cold she had 
interrupted her search for her dog and had consumed a cup of hot tea with a modest 
amount of alcohol to help her warm up. 
RELEVANT FACTS TO THE CHARGE OF INTERFERANCE 
The facts relevant to a determination whether the appellant violated Section 76-8-305 in 
interfering in a lawful detention or arrest are basically undisputed. Deputy Barnes of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department responded to a call to dispatch from appellants 
neighbor, hereinafter referred to as the complainant, that the appellant was intoxicated, 
and throwing her brand new furniture she had stored under the appellants carport space 
around the yard (testimony of Deputy Barnes, page 2 lines 24-25, page 3 line 1, page 11 
line 25, page 12 lines 1-12). Deputy Barnes arrived in her marked patrol car and in 
uniform (page 2 lines 19-23) and observed the appellant enter her car in back of the 
property. She observed the complainant by her front door calling out to stop the 
appellant as she was drunk and attempting to leave (page 3 lines 24-25). Deputy Barnes 
had not observed the appellant commit any offense (page 20 lines 13-15) or throw any 
furniture (page 19 lines 6-8). She immediately approached the appellant in her car and 
without asking any questions ordered her to exit the vehicle (page 12 lines 20-25, page 13 
lines 1-10). 
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The appellant testified at trial that she did not hear the officers' order as she was paying 
attention to the complainant near her door jumping about and yelling that she had 
permission. She was also distraught over her dog. The appellant rolled down the window 
of her car and seeing the officer by her door explained to her that she was trying to 
recover her dog from the objects stacked under her carport stall and intended to move her 
car over and behind that part of the carport for light (page 6 lines 8-17, page 13 lines 11-
21). According to Deputy Barnes "she wasn't sure how it [the appellants explanation] 
had anything to do with what was going on" (page 13 lines 11-21), so she again ordered 
the appellant to exit the car, opened the door to the appellants car and smelled the odor of 
alcohol, and extricated the appellant from her car, placed her on the ground and in 
handcuffs. Because the appellant, prone on the ground, struggled having her hands 
removed from under her body, Deputy Crawford assisted Deputy Barnes in turning the 
appellant over and position her hands up behind her back to put her in to handcuffs and 
place the appellant in to custody (page 6 lines 20-25, page 7 lines 3-4). 
After placing the appellant on the ground and in custody Deputy Barnes then spoke to the 
complainant by her door. She spoke only to the complainant and not to the landlord 
standing nearby who had arrived after being summoned (page 7 lines 18-25, page 22 line 
25) Deputy Barnes observed some chairs and a table turned on the side and was directed 
by the complainant to the opposite side of the complainants vehicle parked under the 
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carport, were she alleged the appellant had damaged her automobile in throwing furniture 
(page 25 lines 17-20). Deputy Barnes observed a broken antenna and a scratch on the 
front fender of the complainant's vehicle (page 8 lines 9-12). 
Deputy Barnes provides no specific facts as to the type of furniture she observed, the 
location of the furniture, or whether the furniture appeared to be damaged. Deputy Barnes 
instead asserts that she placed the appellant in to custody because "she was refusing to 
cooperate with [her] request to exit the vehicle on her own power." (page 22 lines 14-17). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Deputy Barnes took the appellant into custody not because she was performing her 
duty, but instead because she entirely neglected her duty to first investigate before taking 
any action. Deputy Barnes proceeded on presumptions as opposed to reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause. From the outset Deputy Barnes lacked specific facts and 
proceeded only on the complainants allegations. She had not observed the appellant in 
order to form a reasonable belief the appellant was impaired or impaired to a degree that 
rendered her incapable to safely operate her car. In addition the appellant was in the back 
parking area of a private property not open to the general public and not located near the 
entry to the public street, and she resided on that property. 
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Deputy Barnes had no statutory authority and probable cause to take the appellant into 
custody. She disregarded very relevant facts forming the totality of the circumstances and 
did not possess the basic imperatives of concrete facts the appellant either presented a 
danger to herself or anyone on the property or that the appellant committed a public 
offense. The requirement of probable cause is a prerequisite under the Fourth 
Amendment and a constitutional right the appellant was entitled to rely upon. 
Deputy Barnes acted outside the scope of her authority as provided under the laws of the 
State of Utah and the appellant was convicted by means that offend the Due Process 
Clause. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The instruction to the jury on the charge of interference with arresting officer 
under Section 76-8-305 was tantamount to a directed guilty verdict and the 
jury's verdict was not responsive to the issues joined in the information. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-8-305 as enacted in 1953 originally made it an offense to 
intentionally interfere with a person recognized to be a law enforcement official seeking 
to effect an arrest or detention whether there was a legal basis for the arrest. In 1975 the 
8 
Court in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, invalidated the Statute on constitutional 
grounds on the basis that the language of the Statute failed to inform an ordinary citizen 
as to the conduct sought to be proscribed. 
The Legislature in 1981 repealed and reenacted the statute to specify interference in a 
"lawful arrest and detention by use of force or the use of any weapon". In 1990 the 
Legislature amended the Statute and expanded the proscribed conduct to include lawful 
orders. The Statute states: 
76-8-305, Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any 
act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
9 
The State charged the appellant in the information with violating the Section in that "she 
did have knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable care should have had knowledge 
that a peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of the defendant...., 
and did interfere with said arrest or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon". 
Although the charge involved several questions of law, the trial judge provided the jury 
with only a mere abstract of the Act as opposed to declaring the principles of relevant 
laws applicable to the facts brought out in the evidence. Because the jury found the 
appellant not guilty of the remaining charges joined in the information, it required the 
jury then to consider whether the action of the arresting officer was lawful in its inception. 
Instead the instructions to the jury eliminated entirely the material constituents of the 
elements the jury needed to find necessary for conviction and egregiously broadened the 
basis for conviction to include subsections (2) and (3). While the trial judge did not direct 
a guilty verdict in form, the jury instructions had the functional equivalent of a directed 
verdict. 
Compounding the jury's misconception of the issues was the prosecution depicting the 
case compatible to a domestic dispute generally well known among the population as a 
violent and dangerous situation (transcript page 20 lines 8-10) and the officer's action as 
basic and proper police conduct in retaining a person for investigative purposes. The law, 
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however, put thi olticei .IMM
 Lhe prosecutor on n-. .. 
unauthorized and unlav ,. 
In Sibren v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52-53 (1968) the Supreme Court held "Many deep 
and abiding Constitutional problems are encountered primarily af W e i of low visibility 
in the criminal process- in the context of prosecutions :-* ininoi OI ICI IM^ which can) 
only short sentences." 
The constitutional guarantee to due process and trial by jury requires that a defendant be 
afforded the full protection of a j u i ) , iinfettered, and unimpeded in its decision either 
directly or indirectly. In Sandstom v. Montana, 442 < * - ;•_--, r >.. v i UR I h a * v. >u i 
unanimously condemned jur) instructions having i , , •-.,!• ; ^ • \d 
1
 ' C l i i l i ' l , i l i h l I k ' k l I l k 1 ' K i l l '< I " 11, ,11111111 Iii-ll.il l l i . i j i ' J I l l l l J f . 
In United States v. Hayward, 420 F. 2d 142, 144 (DC, Cir. 1969) the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia held that "the rule against directed verdicts of guilt includes 
perforce situations in which the judges insti ucti ons fa 11 sh ::)i I: :>f directing a gi liltj > = i di : t 
1: i it - hi; : I I i ie> er theless hi i \ - e 1:1: I = = ff = : t : f y : • doing I: ] e liminating other relevant 
considerations if the jury finds one fact to be true." 
i i 
While based on federal rules of criminal procedures, the Supreme Court in Bollenbach v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946) ruled that the question is whether guilt has been 
found by a jury according to the procedure and standards approved for criminal trials and 
that the "[discharge of the jury's responsibility for drawing appropriate conclusions from 
the testimony depends on the discharge of the judge's responsibility to give the jury the 
required guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria." 
The Utah Legislature basically adopted the federal rules of criminal procedures and 
pursuant to Utah law the trial judge has the duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable 
to the facts of the case, UCA Section 78-21-3. An information instruction is not a 
substitute for an element instruction. The Jury must be instructed with respect to all 
elements that it must find to convict of the crime charged, and the absence of such 
instruction is reversible error as a matter of law, State v. Jones, 823 P. 2d 1059 (Utah 
1991), citing State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980). 
The prosecutorial misconduct and the jury instructions were so fundamentally 
unfair as to deny the appellant the constitutional right to due process and resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice. 
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In failing to object to the extensive aipiuu.} coiraua. a\r _IK: WLk ' t ; ; -
and made SL: . • *•:« - /.-• n >)iUx> 
I", iiii" V' «i"i \nirn<lp"'nt f<»III"1 < institution, See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
U>o4) and State v. Gallegoes, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
P 0 I ] V 
The State did lie t pi • :>i e the elements of the offense as charged in the information 
If is well established that the State must prove every element of a crime to convict an 
accused defendant, including the specific mens rea eiiiDouud in uic >MJIUU . -. V ^ , .. „ .u A 
\ "i1" 1 " I""1! " I MIT11, "SIT S t a t e v. Slr i i i^ l ia i iK ,3' » s • ' ^*. Male v. 
Pearson, 08S V 'M ') M) o » » 11 In i • " /, well established that the 
evidence must prove that it was committed in the manner charged in the information, 
State v. Hvams, 230 P. 349, 350 (Utah 1924). 
a lawful detention or arrest; (B) the detention or arrest was lawful in that the officer acted 
under the authority of state law or within the scope of her authority; and (C) the appellant 
interfered in the detention or arrest by the use of force or the use of any weapon. 
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A. The appellant did not have knowledge the officer was seeking to effect a 
lawful detention or arrest 
Whether a person has knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention depends in 
the first instance whether the officer is seeking to arrest "that person or another person." 
Only as to the later can the term "by exercise of reasonable care" be applied. Whether a 
person has knowledge a peace officer is seeking to arrest him or her depends on the 
objective circumstances and not on the subjective view harbored by the officer, See 
Berkemer v. Mc Cartv, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 
1991). 
Utah law requires that the person making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested 
of his or her intention, cause, and authority to arrest him or her except when the person is 
arrested during the commission of a crime or under exigent circumstances, UCA Section 
77-7-6. The appellant was not detained in an isolated area or an area where she was 
unknown and could have fled to avoid detention. Instead, the appellant was outside her 
residence and immediately and voluntarily dispelled any question that she intended to 
leave the property. 
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The State did not show prove exigent circumstances existed that pi e \ ei ited tl le ai i estii lg 
I : . i
 u \ s V V] ?oac | S|10WS t | i e appellant was 
entirely unaware of the complainants allegations she had breached the peace and 
willfully damaged her property. 
The State did not prove the statutory element knowledge oi a lavviul detention or arrest or 
the specific and relevant mens rea embodied in tl le Stati it i 
B. Appellants detention under the condition of arrest or arrest was not 
authorized by State Law; the arresting officer acted outside the scope of her 
authority and violated appellants constitutional protected rights under Article 
United Stih ^ ' nislil"lii»L ' ;''••>'•,.. ; ,'•.-..>.• .'•'..• 
In interpreting Statutes Utal fVurts ,.nd the U.S Supreme Court look to the plain 
language of the Statute and presume that each WOK statute was used advisedly, 
1
 *
:
" ^Liu baiicit * rj1 * *- \nhui Anderson LLP, v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
In Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) the Supreme Court held that 
"cannons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the 
meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, 
cardinal canon before all others." The Court emphasized "courts must presume that the 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When 
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then the first canon is also the last: judicial 
inquiry is complete." 
As of the reenactment of UCA Section 76-8-305, subsequent to the Bradshaw decision, 
the conduct proscribed in the Statute is specific and in harmony with the Federal and 
State Constitution. 
According to the plain language of the Statute it is not a crime to reasonable and 
non-violently resist ones unlawful detention or arrest. 
Whether a detention or arrest is lawful depends first and foremost on whether the officer 
is acting under authority of State Law. Pursuant to Utah law a peace officer may stop any 
person in a public place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense, and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his action, UCA 77-7-15. The section 
16 
contemplates that an officer may complete .. - en MI I•• ^ ^ i : v < • 
within the boundaries dra\ ,H( ! iv <bl. hicctive, 
specific IMUI :i« 1 ii'iliable fin < ill i i arrant the intrusion upon that person, State v. Contrel, 
886 P. 2d 107 (Utah Ct. App 1994), cert denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (1995). Deputy Barnes 
had not observed the appellant commit any public offense when ;he approaches ;;,*. 
appellant and ordered her out of the car and she possessed no ot u v n , .•
 M •<-. 
the appellant committed i\\\\ t>f f'nisi " .Illnuijjji 1 k \ iiih H.nih1- ^"^ ' ' i i ; "'•' detected the 
< I i 'I ,il \\\ I III • ,. I • fart (Inif .in individual has consumed alcohol does not give rise 
to a violation under UCA Section 76-9-701(1). The Section is aimed at particular conduct 
rather than the condition of intoxication. While the appellant intended to move her car 
after consuming alcohol, the appellant was on pn\a;o pigpen *...<. L 
public and there was nn iiiiln JIHII III .ipprlliinl IIIIMKICII 1 lt\iv Ihr pinprriy nr w i\ m»t 
i . . « • I • ' • . " 
From the inception Deputy Barnes relied entirely on the accusations of the complainant. 
The allegations that the appellant unreasonable disturbed ? 
damaged piopiMly Mini iillcmplnl In ("let; cntajulnl cnlnrly I'miu flic complainant and 
Barnes never questioned the veracity of the complainant's allegations. When 
asked whether she was under the impression the appellant was throwing the complainants 
furniture, Deputy Barnes responded; "I wasn't under the impression, I was informed by 
dispatch with the complainant on the line with dispatch saying she was throwing 
furniture," (transcript page 12 lines 4-8). Deputy Barnes testimony shows she considered 
the complainant's allegations facts before she even arrived on the scene. 
An arrest is lawful if it is authorized by statute and supported by probable cause, State v. 
Harman, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199-1204 (Utah 1995). 
Deputy Barnes testified she placed the appellant into custody in order to investigate the 
complaint and because the appellant did not exit her car on her own volition. Taking a 
person in to custody is an arrest. Warrant-less arrests in Utah are authorized only in 
limited circumstances and require probable cause, UCA Section 77-7-2. Probable cause 
must be based on either the personal observations of the officer and while committed in 
the presence of the officer or based on reasonable trustworthy information and articulable, 
concrete, and objective facts as opposed to subjective presumptions. 
In State v.White, 586 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993) officers relied on information provided 
by the defendant's former spouse. The Court implicitly held the officers had no 
experience with the defendant's former spouse which would allow them to assume the 
accuracy of the information supplied. The Court concluded that the actions of the officers 
were based "upon unreliable and unverified allegations that were not substantiated by 
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articulable specific facts from whici, - • -. --..iM/ possibility of 
criminal acti .M~^ . ._. \ alenzuela, 37 P. 3d 260' (Utah 
P ' -v •. ^ ! AA that in re!vir- • »<» third party information alone "a reasonable 
and prudent person . . . would not be justified in believing the suspect committed the 
offense." The Court further emphasized, that 
"absent a risk to public safet} ...v , . , . • : • p > l * 
independenl u»n ' p r u ^ v cfl "! information," id at 263. 
;\ .1 in ' unrein in mi in in in essential part of police investigations. W "liilc Deputy Barnes 
characterized her interference in the appellant's liberty as investigative detention, she 
never posed a single question to the appellant even after she placed her in handcu. . .;;. I 
she also did not question the lanuu..,; ... ;. po*. * * , 
while liK'onsisk nl dnnon.slnliw1 :: 11 * * siilvsnint'ntly m:v\v no reasonable inquiry of a truly 
!?1
 -
t iu
 * itnro md relied instead on superficial observations. In addition, the totality 
of the circumstances did not bear the indicia of reliability of the allegations, 
• The complainant was not verbally abusive, aggressive, or tumultuous in the 
" officer's presence, and no other pei 51 • .: i, i » 1 n • ; i i m 1 1 • I „ i i »I" a 
i l l ' 1 1 I I 1 1 » 1 1 1 i I I I I ( " H V H V . ' ' • ' ' • 
5
 ' * * * :r ja of her front door but directed Deputy Barnes to 
damages on her vehicle parked under the carport with the passenger side facing the 
19 
appellants carport stall and accordingly on the side of the vehicle not in her field of 
vision. 
• Furniture having been thrown would cause indentations to the body of the vehicle 
as opposed to a scratch. 
The complainant in the instant case was not a third party impartial informant. Alleged 
victims accusations alone can not form a basis for a warrant-less arrest. A federal case on 
point is Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F. 3d 912 (9th Cir. 2001) where 
it was proclaimed the alleged victim made a false criminal report to provide the means 
whereby the police would take the plaintiff in the case in to custody. The Court held, 
"In establishing probable cause officers may not solely rely on the claim of a 
citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate 
the basis of the witnesses knowledge or interview other witnesses," id at 925. 
Deputy Barnes had understood the appellant was concerned about her dog and attempted 
to retrieve her dog from under her carport, she testified, however, that she "wasn't sure 
how it had anything to do with what was going on" (testimony page 13 line 19). When an 
officer literally has no idea what is going on and whether a citizen has violated the law, 
both the State and Federal Constitution commands that the officer either let the individual 
be or conduct first a proper investigation. An officer may deprive a person of liberty 
when, and only when, the officer has a viable claim that the individual has committed a 
20 
crime. Deputy Barnes did not satisfy that fundamental u ^ ^ 
verified facts Depuly Bailies lac kal piohiihk1 ciiuse. 
'Hi i! hi 1 1 li il iiiiivasonablr seizures is one of the most cherished rights 
guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitution," Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P. 
3d 506, 511 (Utah 2005). 
The Fourth Amendment and Article 1 Section 14 oi u.. , ... '* onstitution taken \niliufiin 
from ti*. -< * .Jonstitu 111 • 11 | i \i > I | > n 1111 .:i 11 11.111 
4 f
 penplr i hv secure in theii pei son . . . against 
unreasonable seizures shall not be violated . . . but upon probable cause"[.] 
Probable cause applies whether the intrusion upon personal security are termed arrests or 
investigatory detentions, Davis v. Missi i|i|ii, y)! 11 "> L ...d , . (I'M)1'). I In inilial 
interference mus: . . ,. |Vi m • • • ... ) 
]
 ' " ^>" • !*' "'• H'i^*. \. Texas. 443 U.S. 47
 v1979), 
and an investigative detention must be brief, unintrusive and can not approach the 
condition of arrest, See Dunway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979). 
!o (lit11 pnilviblr cms f requirement, the Court confined its exclusions to brief stops and the 
frisk for weapons in situations in which the officer acted on his own observations of 
suspicious conduct and oi ; n.ible information that the suspect was armed and dangerous. 
While officer safety was a concern in Terry, "the decision did not create a broad or 
general officer safety exception to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment," State y. 
Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Utah App. 2003). The Court in Brown supra emphasized 
that 'absent a factual basis for detaining the person, the risk of arbitrary and abusive 
police practices is to great," id at 51-52. 
Deputy Barnes testimony reveals that while she did not communicate that fact, she 
immediately decided to place the appellant in to custody based on the mere allegations of 
the complainant and the reason to order the appellant immediately out of her car. 
Pursuant to Utah Law and the rules promulgated by Utah Appellate Courts and the 
United States Supreme Court, however, Deputy Barnes authority was limited to 
conducting a brief inquiry in to suspicious circumstances and any further detention 
required consent or probable cause. 
Deputy Barnes lacked probable cause and lawful authority and the detention and 
arrest of the appellant was unlawful. 
In United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) it was at issue whether officers possessed 
the required probable cause to arrest the defendant. The prosecutor on trial and on appeal 
argued that the defendant's failure to protest the arrest could be used to create probable 
22 
c,i%. ^ tt^ ti resisted his arrest. 
.. * , .
 t j i e c a s e o n 0ther grounds, it did reach the issue of 
resisting arrest on dicta, stating "One has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest 
and Courts will uphold the right of resistance in proper cases," id at 594. 
Unquestionable, innocent people would generally react . ng. 
n o t b a s e d i", irit-.nli IIUI n \ L-^ligtitl* Hi 
C. The appellant did not interfere in the detention or arrest by use of force, 
and the facts do not support the conclusion that she did. 
'—- American HenuiKc uiciioiiary oi Hie hn^n^n i-cu.aia-e p f*N'i I1
 ? , Q) defines 
wci ui viuiuiic^. \ei^4ers Third New International 
Dictionary p. 887 (1986) defines force as strength or energy of an exceptional degree and 
also as to do violence. Blacks Law Dictionary p. 673 (8" ll ed 2004) defines force as 
power, violence, or pressure directed against a pers< • • i L i t g , I l iv111 iii< hi i l c n u i i i i i i i i l n r 
< - . ,
 M . . i K . .. M I j -ls 
generally understood as an aggressive act. A non-passive act is therefore only an act of 
force if there is power or strength of an exceptional degree directed at a person. 
23 
Although Deputy Barnes testified the appellant kicked, the problem with Deputy Barnes 
testimony is that while her action did not comport to the circumstances, she articulates 
the circumstances to comport to her actions. The appellant after having been thrown to 
the ground in a prone position could not kick in the direction of the Deputies. Instead, the 
appellant instinctively reacted to the unexplained, unexpected, and excessive force 
employed by Deputy Barnes. A reasonable evaluation of Deputy Barnes testimony shows 
instead that the appellant protested and struggled for balance due to her prone position 
and struggled with having her arms painfully forced up behind her back. 
There was no strength, power, or violence directed at the Deputies, there was no 
force exerted by the appellant herself as force is defined. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Deputy Barnes acted outside the scope of her authority and because the 
conviction was obtained by methods that offend the Due Process Clause, the conviction 
of the appellant necessitates for the verdict to be overturned. 
Wherefore the appellant respectfully request that this Honorable Court reverse the 
judgment of the lower court for an entry of acquittal. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
24 
This case presents important issues regarding the District Courts interpretation of UCA 
Section 76-8-305 pertaining to interference with a peace officer, and jury instructions 
having the effect of a directed guilty verdict. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ 13 i^ _day of November 2006. 
Maria Joyce Jacobs 
Appellant pro se 
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ADDENDUM 
FILED DISTBIST COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 1 5 2606 
SALT LAKE COUNTY J J 
~~ Deputyuleri 
In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 041907003 
You are instructed that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, is charged by the 
Information which has been duly filed with the commission of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF; 
INTERFERENCE WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING AN ARREST; DISORDERLY 
CONDUCT; and INTOXICATION. The Information alleges: 
COUNT I 
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 1028 Riches Avenue, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about October 21, 2004, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
106, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, 
a party to the offense, intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the property of Nancy Garner, 
causing a pecuniary loss to Nancy Garner equal to or in excess of $300, but less than $1,000 in 
value. 
COUNT II 
INTERFERENCE WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING AN ARREST, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, at 1028 Riches Avenue, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 
21, 2004, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 305, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, a party to the offense, did have 
knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have had knowledge, that a peace officer 
was seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of the defendant or another, and did interfere 
with said arrest or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon. 
COUNT ra 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT, a Class C Misdemeanor, at 1028 Riches Avenue, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about October 21, 2004, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 9, Section 
102(l)(b)(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE 
JACOBS, a party to the offense, intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or 
recklessly created a risk thereof, after a request by another to desist, engaged in fighting or in 
violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior. 
COUNT IV 
INTOXICATION, a Class C Misdemeanor, at 1028 Riches Avenue, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about October 21, 2004, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 9, Section 701(1), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, aparty 
to the offense, was under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance having 
the property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the defendant may have endangered herself 
or another, in a public place or in a private place where the defendant unreasonably disturbed other 
persons. 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041907003 MO 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: June 26, 2 0 06 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynm 
Prosecutor: BROWN, TIFFANY M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SEAMAN, CHRISTINE M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 14, 1946 
Audio 
Tape Number: 41 Tape Count: 1044 
CHARGES 
2. INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/14/2006 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST 
a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 170 day(s). 
Attorney Fees Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Page 1 
Case No: 041907003 
Date: Jun 26, 2 0 06 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 12 month(s). 
Probation is to be-supervised by Salt Lake Co Probation Service. 
Defendant to serve 10 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws. 
The defendant to enter into and complete the Cognitive 
Restructuring classes approved by the Court or Probation Officer. 
The defendant is to serve 10 days jail forthwith. 
The defendant is to pay fine of $750 and recoupment of $500 at the 
rate of $150 a month beginni.ng 30 days after release. 
The defendant is not to drink or possess alcohol or be present when 
alcohol is present or being consumed. 
The defendant is to be evaluated and complete any alcohol abuse 
treatment recommended. 
Dated this day of , 20 . 
STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
STATUTORY DEFINITION OF Interference with Arresting Officer 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 3 ? 
A person commits Interference With Arresting Officer if she 
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person and interferes with the 
arrest or detention by: 
(1) the use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by 
lawful order: (a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; 
and (b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention; or, 
(3)the arrested person's refusal to refrain from performing any 
act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Page 8 
ELEMENTS OF Interference with Arresting Officer 
INSTRUCTION NO ^)~$? _ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Maria Joyce Jacobs, 
of the crime of Interference With Arresting Officer, as charged 
in count II of the Information, you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that 
crime: 
1. That on or about the 21st day of October, 2004, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Maria 
Joyce Jacobs, as a party to the offense, had 
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care 
should have had knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of her; 
and 
2. That Maria Joyce Jacobs did interfere with the arrest 
or detention by use of force or any weapon; 
or 
3. That Maria Joyce Jacobs did refuse to perform any act 
required by lawful order necessary to effect the 
arrest or detention and made by a peace officer 
involved in the arrest or detention; 
or 
4. That Maria Joyce Jacobs refused to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede her arrest or 
detention. 
INSTRUCTION NO. SJ ( 
Page 9 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Interference With Arresting 
Officer as charged in count II of the information. If, on the 
other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find 
the defendant not guilty of count II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Page 15 
Annoyance is defined as a condition or situation that 
interferes with the use or enjoyment of property. 
Desist is defined as to stop or leave off. 
A person engages in conduct Intentionally, or with intent 
or willfully with respect to the nature of her conduct or to a 
result of her conduct, when it is her conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct Knowingly, or with knowledge, 
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct when she is aware of the nature of her conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is 
aware that her conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
A person engages in conduct Recklessly with respect to 
circumstances surrounding her conduct or the result of her 
conduct when she is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist 
or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under 
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Tumultuous is defined as tumult, a violent agitation of 
mind or feelings, a violent outburst. 
Violent is defined as (1) strong physical force, or (2) 
passionately threatening. 
DEFINITIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. 41 
Note posted by Garner on my front door the night of 
October 20,2004. 
•fffifA-
Cash Count Franking D< 
CMInital 
13 
Math* tfcuuw VxidConQn^ 
force, n. Power, violence, or pressure directed against 
a person or thing. 
actual force. Force consisting in a physical act, esp. 
a violent act directed against a robbery victim. — 
Also termed physical force. [Cases: Roobery <3=D6. 
CJ.S. Robbery §§" 13-23.] 
constructive force. Threats and intimidation to 
gain control or prevent resistance; esp., threaten-
ing words or gestures directed against a robbery 
victim. [Cases: Robbery <S=»6. CJ.S. Robbery 
§§ 13-23.] 
deadly force. Violent action known to create a 
substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily 
harm. • A person may use deadly force in self-
defense only if retaliating against another's deadly 
force. — Also termed extreme force. Cf. nondeadly 
force. 
"Under the common law the use of deadly force is never 
permitted for the sole purpose of stopping one fleeing from 
arrest on a misdemeanor charge " Rollin M. Perkins & 
Ronald N, Boyce, Criminal Law 1098 (3d ed. 1982). 
excessive force. Unreasonable or unnecessary force 
under the circumstances. 
extreme force. See deadly force. 
independent force. Force not stimulated by a situa-
tion created by the actor's conduct. 
intervening force. Force that actively produces 
harm to another after the actor's negligent act or 
omission has been committed. 
irresistible force. Force that cannot be foreseen or 
controlled, esp. that which prevents the perform-
ance of a contractual obligation; FORCE MAJEURE. 
[Cases: Contracts <S=*309(1). CJ.S. Contracts 
§ § 5 2 0 - 5 2 2 , 5 2 4 . ] 
force (fors, fors) n. 1. The capacity to do work or cause physical 
change; energy, strength, or active power: the force of an explo-
sion. 2. a. Power made operative against resistance; exertion: use 
force in driving a nail. b. The use of physical power or violence 
to compel or restrain: a confession obtained by force. 3. a. Intel-
lectual power or vigor, especially as conveyed in writing or 
speech, b. Moral strength, c. A capacity for affecting the mind 
•or behavior; efficacy: the force of logical argumentation, d. One 
that possesses such capacity: the forces of evil. 4. a. A body of 
persons or other resources organized or available for a certain 
purpose: a large labor force, h. A person or group capable of 
influential action: a retired senator who is still a force in national 
politics. 5. a. Military strength, b. The entire military strength, 
as of a nation, c. Units of a nation's military personnel, especially 
those deployed into combat: Our forces have at last engaged the 
enemy. 6. Law. Legal validity. 7. Physics. A vector quantity 
that tends to produce an acceleration of a body in the direction of 
its application, —force tr.v. forced, forcing, foroes. 1. To 
compel through pressure or necessity: i" forced myself to practice 
daily. He was forced to take a second job. 2. a. To gain by the use 
of force or coercion: force a confession, b. To move or effect 
against resistance or inertia: forced my foot into the shoe. c. To 
inflict or impose relentlessly: He forced his ideas upon the group. 
3. a. To put undue strain on: She forced her voice despite being 
hoatse. b. To increase or accelerate (a pace, for example) to the 
o 
'lorce Vfo(a)rst rfd(3)rs, 'fdas, 'fd(3)s\ n -s often attrib [ME,: fr. MF force, fr. (assumed) VL fortia% fr. L fortis strong -f -ia 
•y — more at FORT] l a : strength or energy esp. of an ex-
ceptional degree : active power : VIGOR to : physical strength 
or vigor of a living being {drained of all ~ by his mighty effort) 
C : power to affect in physical relations or conditions <the ~ 
of the blow was somewhat spent when it reached him) <the 
rising ~ of the wind) d : moral or mental strength esp. when 
manifested as power of effective action (as in the overcoming 
of deposition) (the ~ of his character had the impact of a 
physical pressure) (a man of great ~ and determination) 
e : power or capacity to sway, convince, or impose obligation 
: VALIDITY, EFFECT (the ~ of his arguments) (who could resist 
the ~ of such an appeal); often : legal efficacy : operative 
effect (that law is still in ~> (an agreement haying tne ~ of 
law) 2 a : might or greatness esp. of a prince or state; often 
: strength in or capacity for waging war (the ~ of this ford 
was so great that no other would contest his right to rule) 
to (1) 5 a group of individuals occupied with or ready for com-
bat (the entire ~ of the fortress); usu 5 a body of troops, ships, 
airplanes, or combinations thereof esp. when assigned to a 
particular military purpose or necessity (took a small ^ of 
infantrymen and searched the village) (the enemy assembled a 
great ~ for the spring offensive) — see TASK FORCE (2) forces 
pi : the whole military strength (as of a nation) : ARMED 
FORCES C : a body of persons available for or serving a 
particular end (a large available labor ~>; often : a more or 
less organized group or staff having a common responsibility 
or task (a conscientious police ~ > (the plantation ~ took a 
half-holiday) 3 a : power, violence, compulsion, or con-
straint exerted upon or against a person or thing (conciliation 
may succeed where.~ completely fails) (those who will not 
respond to kindness must yield to ~ ) to : strength or power of 
any degree that is exercised without justification or contrary 
to law upon a person or thing C : violence or such threat or 
display of physical aggression toward a person as reasonably 
inspires fear of pain, bodily harm, or death 4 dial Eng : a 
large part, quantity, or number 5 : an agency or influence (as 
a push or pull) that if applied to a free body results chiefly in 
an acceleration of the body and sometimes in elastic deforma-
tion and other effects (as from overcoming cohesion or adhesion 
or sustaining weight) 6 X the quality of conveying impressions 
intensely in writing or speech (as by vividness, cogency, or 
passion) (a stimulating essay marked by ~ and cogency) 
7 J an act (as of misdirection) or course (as of play) that 
forces the response of another (as in a play in a game) into a 
Eredetermined pattern (sometimes a ~ is useful for locating onors in the opponents' hands) 8 a : the upper hollow em-
bossing die t SCOUNTER 10b b : a specially formed bar or 
plate attached to the underside of the slide of a punch press 
chiefly for use in riveting and seaming 9 : a billiards stroke 
made by striking a cue ball hard and just below the center so 
that it rebounds or stops sharply or goes off at a desired angle 
after striking the object ball 
syn VIOLENCE, COMPULSION, COERCION, DURESS, CONSTRAINT, 
78-21-3. Court to decide questions of law. 
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the facts 
preliminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other writings, 
and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by the court and 
all discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is 
by law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the 
jury, who are bound to accept it. 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any 
peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device 
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or 
records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A 
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person 
may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
77-7-7. Force in making arrest. 
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being informed 
of the intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable 
force to effect the arrest. Deadly force may be used only as provided in Section 
76-2-404. 
76-9-701. Intoxication — Release of arrested person or 
placement in detoxification center. 
(1) Aperson is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic 
vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a 
public place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other 
persons. 
77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. 
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested of 
his intention, cause, and authority to arrest him. Such notice shall not be 
required when: 
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety 
of the officer or another person or will likely enable the party being 
arrested to escape; 
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, 
or an attempt to commit, an offense; or 
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commis-
sion of an offense or an escape. 
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in Subsection 78-24a-l(2), is 
arrested for an alleged violation of a criminal law, including a local 
ordinance, the arresting officer shall assess the communicative abilities of 
the hearing-impaired person and conduct this notification, and any 
further notifications of rights, warnings, interrogations, or taking of 
statements, in a manner that accurately and effectively communicates 
with the hearing-impaired person including qualified interpreters, lip 
reading, pen and paper, typewriters, computers with print-out capability, 
and telecommunications devices for the deaf. 
(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor to be considered by any 
court when evaluating whether statements of a hearing-impaired person 
were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful 
order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-305, enacted by L. as enacted by § 76-8-305, relating to interfer-
1981, ch. 62, § 1; 1990, cb. 274, § 1. ence with law enforcement official seeking to 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws detain interferor or another, and enacted 
1981, ch. 62, § 1 repealed former § 76-8-305, present § 76-8-305. 
1 dispatch call that said there was a civil dispute and 
2 disturbance, correct? 
3 A Yes, 
4 Q And in that call you were under the impression that 
5 Maria Jacobs was throwing her neighbor's property, correct? 
6 A I wasn't under the impression, I was informed by 
7 dispatch with the complainant on the line with dispatch 
8 saying that she was throwing furniture. 
9 Q And you were also told that she was extremely 
10 intoxicated, correct? 
11 A I was told that there was a possible intoxication 
12 issue. 
13 Q Okay. And then you arrived here and what is the 
14 first thing that you notice? 
15 A The complainant standing at the doorway and some 
16 furniture tumbled around the she was indicating to the car, 
17 1 you need to stop her, she's drunk. 
18 Q So Maria was in the car at this time? 
19 A Yes, ma' am. 
20 Q Okay. And you approached Ms. Jacobs and you 
21 testified that you instructed her to exit the car, correct? 
22 A Yes, ma'am. 
23 Q You didn't tell her she was being arrested, 
24 correct? 
25 J A She wasn't being arrested at that time. I was 
12 
1 investigating a disturbance. 
2 Q Okay, so you didn't tell her that? 
3 A No. 
4 Q And you didn't tell her why you wanted her to get 
5 out of the car, did you? 
6 A I don't recall what the exact words I said at that 
7 time.
 t 
8 Q Okay. There's nothing in the police report about 
9 you mentioning why she had to get out of the car, correct? 
10 A I didn't specify that but... 
11 Q Okay. And do you remember her saying at this time 
12 that her dog was missing? 
13 A Like I said, I remember a tumult of statements 
14 being issued from her you know, regarding no, I didn't do 
15 anything wrong, I need to get my dog, I need to park my car, 
16 this kind of - but it was very jumbled. 
17 Q You were aware that there was a concern she had 
18 about her dog then? 
19 A I wasn't sure how it had anything to do with what 
20 was going on. So that's why I wanted to question her 
21 further. 
22 Q Okay. And do you remember a man approaching at 
23 this time? 
24 A I don't recall anybody else. I was pretty focused 
25 on what was going on. 
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1 Q You don't remember if a car was in there also? 
2 A I don't remember. 
3 Q Now, you didn't take pictures of what you witnessed 
4 on that car did you? 
5 A No ma'am. 
6 Q Okay. Officer, you didn't see Maria Jacobs throw 
7 any furniture on October 21 did you? 
8 A No, ma'am. 
9 MS. WELCH: I have no further questions. 
10 THE COURT: Redirect? 
11 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. FERBRACHE: 
13 Q You were in that area at around 2:30 a.m.; is that 
14 right? 
15 A Yes, sir. 
16 Q At 1028 Riches Avenue? 
17 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
18 Q Salt Lake County? 
19 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
20 Q And it was dark outside? 
21 A Yes, it was 2:30 in the morning. 
22 Q 2:30 in the morning. And you were dispatched on a 
23 civil dispute? 
24 A Yes, ma'am - yes, sir. 
25 Q That's fine. When you're dispatched on a civil 
19 
1 dispute, is there at times criminal activity? 
2 A Is there, I'm sorry, what? 
3 Q Do you anticipate that there may be or may not be 
4 criminal activity? 
5 A It was dispatched as an active civil dispute. So I 
6 expected that there would be, you know, an ongoing active 
7 problem at that point, 
8 Q And when you've been dispatched on domestic or 
9 civil disputes, have you had to conduct arrests or engage in 
10 detaining people for purpose of investigating the scene? 
11 A If I find it necessary for my safety or the safety 
12 of the other people at the scene, yes. 
13 Q So when you approached, you really hadn't seen any 
14 criminal conduct at that point; is that right? 
15 A No, sir. 
16 Q So your approaching and you observe somebody in a 
17 vehicle; is that right? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q How often do you allow people to leave the scene of 
20 an investigation? 
21 A Never. 
22 Q And so what would you do when somebody is 
23 attempting to leave the scene of an investigation? 
24 A I would attempt to detain them so that I can 
25 conduct my investigation. 
20 
Q And is that what you did this evening? 
A Yes. 
Q And how did you do that? 
A I approached the vehicle and requested that she 
exit the vehicle and speak to me. 
Q And what sort of tone or how did you conduct that? 
A You know, initially I'm sure I wouldn't have yelled 
at her or been aggressive in that I really didn't know what 
was happening yet. I initially would approach the vehicle 
and request in a civil tone that somebody cooperate with my 
investigation. 
Q And at the point you opened the vehicle door, what 
was the situation for you? 
A I could see that the person I was engaging was very 
upset. I could smell the alcohol. I could see that she was 
very tense, that she was angry. 
Q Was there an issue of safety? 
A At that point, yes there was. I was concerned that 
she would engage the vehicle and try to move the vehicle 
because she kept screaming, MI need to get back to my parking 
spot 
Q Was there an issue of criminal activity? 
A At that point I could see that there was a problem, 
you know, because the furniture had been turned over and the 
criminal activity at that point would have been being in or 
21 
1 about a vehicle with alcohol in your system. 
2 Q So what was the proper steps that you would take in 
3 all situations? 
4 A In any situation where I need to question someone 
5 whose being uncooperative,. I will put them in custody for my 
6 safety and the safety of the person I'm questioning. 
7 I Q And is this your training or is this your own 
personal belief? 
9 I A This is my training. 
10 Q And did you conduct that that evening, did you 
11 follow through with your training? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And how did you do that? 
14 A I extricated Ms. Jacobs from the vehicle as she was 
15 refusing to cooperate with my request to exit, the vehicle on 
16 her own power. So I extricated her from the vehicle and 
17 placed her in custody. 
18 Q And you did that because? 
19 A Because I was fearful for her safety and my safety, 
20 and the safety of all the other people on the scene. 
2J- J Q Now there's a question as to the photographs and do 
you carry a camera with you? 
A No sir, I do not. 
Q Are you the person in charge of taking photographs? 
&$ | • • A No sir, I'm not. 
22 
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